The Growth Architect: What David Berg’s European Wax Center Playbook Tells You About Primrose’s Next Five Years

Before projecting Berg’s impact on Primrose, you need to understand what he actually executed at European Wax Center — not the press-release version, but the operational reality.

The EWC Growth Machine

Berg joined European Wax Center as CEO in 2018 when the system had approximately 650 locations. By the time he departed in 2024, the count exceeded 1,100. Key metrics from his tenure:

• ~70% unit growth over six years — roughly 75 net new locations per year
• IPO execution in August 2021, raising approximately $180M at a $1.6B valuation
• Post-IPO same-store sales growth that was initially strong but decelerated meaningfully by 2023–2024
• Franchisee satisfaction scores that remained above-average for the personal services category
• Average unit volume increases driven partly by service-line additions and price optimization

Berg’s EWC playbook had identifiable components: aggressive territory mapping, streamlined real estate selection, reduced build-out timelines, and a franchise sales machine that kept development agreements flowing. He also pushed operational standardization — tighter SOPs, technology integration for scheduling and CRM, and a brand-marketing apparatus funded through system advertising fees.

What the Playbook Assumed

Every element of that growth playbook rested on structural characteristics of the waxing category:

• Low labor intensity. A typical EWC operates with 8–15 estheticians. No government-mandated staffing ratios.
• Short ramp periods. New EWC locations can approach profitability within 6–9 months. Client acquisition is faster in personal services than in childcare.
• Lower per-unit investment. EWC buildouts run $350K–$550K in total investment. Primrose schools require $5M+ all-in.
• Minimal regulatory burden. Esthetician licensing is state-level but straightforward. No classroom-level ratio mandates, no health inspections of food service, no background-check requirements for every employee.
• Recurring revenue without enrollment dependency. Wax pass memberships create predictable revenue from month one. Childcare enrollment builds family by family over 18–24 months.

Berg is a skilled operator. But skill doesn’t transfer across category constraints. The playbook that works in low-complexity, low-capital, low-regulation franchising doesn’t simply apply to a business where a single classroom’s staffing ratio is set by statute.

The distinction matters because franchise press coverage consistently treats executive hires as category-neutral events. “Growth CEO joins childcare brand” reads as a straightforward upgrade. But the growth mechanisms available in personal services — faster unit openings, leaner staffing, lower capital thresholds, shorter payback periods — are structurally absent in licensed childcare. Evaluating Berg’s appointment requires understanding not just what he accomplished, but which of those accomplishments depended on category characteristics that Primrose does not share.

This is the section that matters most for your underwriting. Every growth lever Berg pulled at EWC faces a structural constraint at Primrose.

Staffing Ratios Kill Velocity

In waxing, you can open a location with a skeleton crew and scale staff as demand builds. In licensed childcare, you cannot legally operate a classroom without meeting mandated teacher-to-child ratios — typically 1:4 for infants, 1:10 for preschool, varying by state.

This means Primrose schools must hire their full teaching staff before they can enroll to capacity. The payroll ceiling analysis documents the math: a new Primrose school needs 35–45 teachers and assistants at full enrollment, and labor costs run 45%+ of revenue even in mature units. During the ramp period, payroll as a percentage of revenue can exceed 60%.

Berg cannot solve this with operational efficiency. The ratios are law.

The 18–24 Month Enrollment Ramp Is Not Compressible

EWC’s growth rate depended on new locations reaching contribution margin quickly. In childcare, families make enrollment decisions months in advance, tour multiple facilities, and transition children gradually. Most Primrose schools don’t reach 85% enrollment — the threshold for break-even in most markets — until 18–24 months post-opening.

You cannot marketing-spend your way past this constraint. Parents don’t impulse-buy childcare. Every new location enters an extended cash-negative period regardless of how efficiently the franchisor processes development agreements.

Capital Requirements Create Natural Growth Ceilings

EWC’s $350K–$550K total investment meant a broad pool of qualified franchisee candidates. Primrose’s $5M+ per-unit investment dramatically narrows the buyer pool to:

• Multi-unit operators with existing portfolios and institutional financing relationships
• High-net-worth individuals willing to deploy significant capital into a single asset
• Development groups backed by private capital

This is why Primrose’s recent growth announcements emphasize multi-unit deals — 27 new school commitments in June 2026, with two 11-school development agreements anchoring the pipeline. Berg isn’t selling $400K franchises to first-time operators. He’s selling portfolios to institutional-scale buyers.

That’s a different risk profile. When your fellow franchisees are development groups optimizing for exit multiples rather than owner-operators optimizing for cash flow, system-level decision-making shifts toward growth metrics that serve the franchisor and its PE sponsor — not necessarily toward policies that protect per-unit profitability.

Licensing Adds 4–8 Months Per Location

EWC could open a location within 4–6 months of lease signing. A Primrose school must obtain state childcare licensing, pass health and safety inspections, meet fire code requirements for facilities housing children, and in many states complete a multi-month provisional licensing period before operating at full capacity.

This isn’t an operational bottleneck Berg can engineer around. It’s a regulatory reality that puts a hard ceiling on how quickly the system can translate signed development agreements into operating schools generating royalty revenue.

At EWC, a signed lease could produce a revenue-generating location in under six months. At Primrose, a signed development agreement may not produce a revenue-generating school for 18–24 months — and that school won’t reach stabilized enrollment for another 18–24 months after that. The gap between “commitments signed” and “royalty-producing mature units” is measured in years, not quarters. This timeline mismatch is critical: the franchisor collects franchise fees at signing and begins collecting royalties at opening, but the franchisee doesn’t reach positive cash flow until enrollment stabilizes far later.

The 2026 FDD year-over-year analysis documents what happened when Primrose grew its unit count by 6.3% (from 525 to 558 schools) in CY2025:

• System AUV fell to $2,659,000 — down 2.5% from CY2024’s $2,728,570
• Top-quartile average revenue dropped to $3,586,393 — down 5.9% from $3,812,543
• Only 37.7% of top-quartile schools exceeded the top-quartile average — meaning even the best cohort is pulled upward by outliers

This is growth dilution in real-time, documented in the franchisor’s own disclosure. The quartile revenue analysis breaks down what these distributions mean for individual operators: the system average is increasingly aspirational, the median is likely materially lower, and profitability is concentrating among incumbents in established markets with mature enrollment and legacy lease terms.

What Accelerated Growth Does to These Numbers

If Berg executes his playbook and pushes Primrose from 558 to 650+ schools by 2028 — consistent with the 560-school expansion trajectory — expect the dilution to compound:

• Every new school entering its 18–24 month ramp pulls system AUV further down. At 20+ net new schools per year, you’re adding 40–60 sub-average performers to the denominator at any given time.
• New-market entries carry higher risk. Primrose’s brand recognition is strongest in its legacy Sun Belt markets. Schools opening in the Pacific Northwest, Mountain West, or Northeast face longer enrollment ramps against established local competitors.
• Staffing competition intensifies with density. Two Primrose schools in the same metro draw from the same pool of early childhood educators — and BriefGlance’s analysis notes that teacher pipeline constraints are already a primary growth limiter in mature markets.

The CY2025 data is the baseline. Under accelerated growth, the next FDD cycle is more likely to show continued AUV pressure than a revenue inflection.

Primrose’s June 2026 announcement of 27 new school commitments is the first major growth signal under Berg’s leadership. Decode what it actually means.

The Multi-Unit Concentration

Two development groups signed 11-school agreements, accounting for 22 of the 27 commitments. This tells you several things:

• Growth is driven by a small number of large operators. The system’s expansion depends on a handful of development groups executing multi-year buildout plans. If one group stalls — financing issues, construction delays, market softness — the pipeline impact is outsized.
• Single-unit franchisee development is not the priority. Berg’s EWC playbook relied heavily on multi-unit developers. He’s importing the same model. If you’re a single-unit operator, recognize that system strategy is being optimized for operators with different economics, risk tolerances, and exit timelines than yours.
• These deals are PE-aligned. Large development agreements accelerate unit count on the timeline that matters for Taurus Capital Partners’ investment horizon. They also commit to territory allocations that may affect your designated area — Primrose’s franchise agreement does not grant exclusive territories.

The FUND TopScore Factor

Primrose secured its fourth consecutive FUND TopScore in 2026, which signals strong SBA lending support and makes financing accessible for new franchisees. This is relevant because it removes the capital-access bottleneck that might otherwise naturally limit growth velocity.

When lenders are eager to finance new units, the constraint on growth shifts entirely to operational execution — staffing, enrollment, licensing. The FUND TopScore is simultaneously a positive signal (lenders believe in the model) and a risk factor (easier financing enables development commitments that outpace the system’s ability to support them operationally).

What the Pipeline Means for Existing Operators

If you already own a Primrose school, 27 new commitments mean:

• More schools competing for teachers in your labor market. The early childhood educator pipeline is finite. New schools recruiting in your metro drive up your staffing costs.
• Potential enrollment competition in adjacent territories. Primrose’s non-exclusive territory structure means a new school three miles away is a real possibility in growing metros.
• System resources diverted to new-unit support. Franchisor attention, field support, and marketing resources tilt toward opening new schools during aggressive growth phases. Existing operators often report feeling deprioritized.

Check franchise investor data sources for the most current disclosure data and compare it against what your broker is presenting.

Berg’s appointment is not a reason to invest or not invest in Primrose. It’s a data point that reshapes your risk model. Here’s how to incorporate it.

If You’re Evaluating a New-Unit Development Agreement

1. Underwrite to bottom-quartile numbers, not averages. Under accelerated growth, system averages will continue to be diluted by ramping locations. Your relevant comp set is schools in their first three years in markets similar to yours.
2. Model a 24-month cash burn. Don’t assume Berg’s operational efficiency will compress enrollment ramps. No CEO has demonstrated the ability to do this in licensed childcare. Build your pro forma with 24 months of sub-breakeven operations and verify your capitalization covers it.
3. Stress-test your staffing plan. If Primrose is opening multiple schools in your metro over the next three years, model wage escalation above the 4–5% baseline. Teacher acquisition costs increase with local system density.
4. Ask about territory protections directly. Berg’s EWC playbook involved dense territory fill. Primrose’s franchise agreement provides designated areas, not exclusive territories. Understand exactly what protection you have — and what you don’t — before signing.
5. Factor in the PE timeline. Taurus Capital Partners has owned Primrose since 2019. PE hold periods typically run 5–7 years. You may be buying into a system that changes ownership within the first years of your operation. Ask your franchise attorney what a franchisor change-of-control means for your agreement.

If You Already Own a Primrose School

• Document your current staffing pipeline strength. If Berg’s growth push creates teacher competition in your market, your ability to retain experienced staff is your single most important competitive advantage.
• Review your territory’s development pipeline. Request information from your franchise business consultant about committed and planned openings within 10 miles of your location.
• Monitor system AUV trends in the next FDD cycle. If CY2026 data shows further AUV decline alongside unit growth, the dilution thesis is confirmed and your unit’s relative performance matters more than system averages.

The Bottom Line

David Berg is a proven franchise growth executive. His track record at European Wax Center is real. But franchise growth skill is not franchise category neutral. The structural constraints of licensed childcare — mandated ratios, enrollment ramps, regulatory licensing, $5M+ unit costs — create an operating environment where the EWC playbook collides with physics.

The franchise press will celebrate every new commitment announcement. The FDD data will tell you whether those commitments are creating value for operators or extracting it.

Read the data. Ignore the celebration.

Berg’s hire tells you one thing with certainty: the pace of new-unit development will increase. What it does not tell you is whether that pace creates value for the operators funding it. The FDD is the only document that answers that question — and the CY2025 edition already suggests the answer is more complicated than the franchise press wants you to believe.

Your job as a prospective franchisee is not to evaluate whether Berg is a talented executive. He clearly is. Your job is to evaluate whether his mandate — aggressive unit growth on a PE-aligned timeline — is compatible with the economics of your specific school, in your specific market, at your specific capitalization level. Those are questions no CEO appointment can answer. Only your diligence can.